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COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY IN THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: THE UNITED
STATES BASIC FRAMEWORK AND
FUTURE MILITARY (AND
QUASI-MILITARY) OPERATIONS
Joshua E. Kastenberg*
The purpose of this essay is not to argue for changes to international
humanitarian law, the law of war, or the legal structures governing military
command, but rather to confirm that the basic legal framework of the United
States does not provide a means to excuse lapses in command responsibility
in future engagements.1 The military command model examined in this
article begins with the president’s Commander in Chief authority and how
this authority is expansive, delegable, and contained. The term “contained”
denotes that the authority to subject to liability for its misuse whether for a
law of war violation or for other “extra-legal” acts. (It is not a purpose of this
article to argue that any particular president, past or notional, has committed
war crimes, but rather to assess the United States’ constitutional command
authority construct in light of command responsibility obligations). The
doctrine of command responsibility can be defined as “a legal doctrine which
in certain circumstances imposes criminal liability on a military commander
for law of war violations committed by forces under [that commander’s]

* Joshua E. Kastenberg is the Karelitz Professor of Evidence at the University of New
Mexico, School of Law. Prior to teaching at this institution, Professor Kastenberg served as a judge
advocate in several positions including cyber operations and intelligence oversight from 1996 to
2016.
1. For the purpose of this essay, the terms “law or war” and “international humanitarian law”
are used interchangeably. See, e.g., FRITS KALSHOVEN & LIESBETH ZEGFELD, CONSTRAINTS ON
THE WAGING OF WAR: AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 11 (2001);
Christopher Greenwood, Historical Development and Legal Basis, in THE HANDBOOK OF
HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICTS 9 (Dieter Fleck ed., 1999). Just as the purpose of this
essay is not to seek changes in the legal construct governing liabilities arising from conflict, this
essay does not seek a new definition for either term.
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command.”2 The United States Department of Defense concluded in its 2015
Law of War Manual that “[c]ommanders have duties to take necessary and
reasonable measures to ensure that their subordinates do not commit
violations of the law of war.”3 The Manual also notes that a commander can
be held responsible for the conduct of forces under her or his command, either
by taking an affirmative role in the commission of law of war offenses, or
omission in failing to prevent offenses.4 This is an important point: failing
to take the steps necessary to prevent law of war offenses from occurring,
when a commander has the authority or ability to do so, may also constitute
an offense.5 Commanders also have a duty to ensure that forces that commit
such offenses are held liable through one of several adjudicatory systems,

2. VICTOR M. HANSEN & LAWRENCE FREIDMAN, THE CASE FOR CONGRESS: SEPARATION
POWERS AND THE WAR ON TERROR 54 (2009). The authors of this book refer to “the
commander” in a vernacular denoting that such persons are men (e.g. him, his). My bracketing of
words is to ensure that commanders may be from both genders. See also In re Yamashita, 327 U.S.
1, 14-16 (1946); Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767 (9th Cir. 1996); Secretary-General’s
Report on Aspects of Establishing an International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory
of the Former Yugoslavia, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (May 3, 1993), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1159, 1192-94
(1993). The international application of the doctrine of command responsibility differs. See
Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Judgment (Trial Chamber ICTY, March 3, 2000) ¶¶ 295, 302 (“Proof is
required that the superior has effective control over the persons committing the violations of
international humanitarian law in question, that is, has the material ability to prevent the crimes and
to punish the perpetrators thereof.”); Prosecutor v. Kayishema, Judgment (Trial Chamber ICTR,
May 21, 1999) ¶ 229 (stating that the “material ability to control the actions of subordinates is the
touchstone of individual responsibility under Article 6(3)”); Prosecutor v. Delalic, Judgment (Trial
Chamber ICTY, Nov. 16, 1998) ¶¶ 377, 378; Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Judgment (Trial Chamber
ICTR, Sept. 2, 1998) ¶ 491.
3. The Secretary of Defense is established by 10 U.S.C. § 113, which reads in pertinent part:
OF

(a) There is a Secretary of Defense, who is the head of the Department of Defense, appointed
from civilian life by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. A person
may not be appointed as Secretary of Defense within seven years after relief from active duty
as a commissioned officer of a regular component of an armed force.
(b) The Secretary is the principal assistant to the President in all matters relating to the
Department of Defense. Subject to the direction of the President and to this title and section 2
of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3002) he has authority, direction, and control
over the Department of Defense.

10 U.S.C. § 113(a)-(b) (Supp. III. 2012). It should be noted that the term “command” is absent from
this language, but by analogy, the Secretary has authority and control over forces in a manner
analogous to command. Policies and orders relating to all aspects of the military may be issued by
the Secretary of Defense unless contrary to law. This includes adherence to international law norms.
These norms are now found in the Manual. See DEPT’T OF DEF., DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE LAW
OF WAR MANUAL§ 18.23.3, at 1123 (2015) [hereafter MANUAL]. On the history of this manual and
its applicability to military personnel, see generally Charles Dunlap, The DoD Law of War Manual
and its Critics: Some Observations, 92 INT’L L. STUDIES 85 (2016); Dep’t of Def., Directive
2311.01E (Feb. 22, 2011).
4. MANUAL, supra note 3, § 18.23, at 1122-24.
5. Id. § 18.23, at 1122-23.

379 KASTENBERG (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

CO M MA N D RES PO NS IB ILI TY

4/11/2017 7:45 PM

381

including military trials titled as courts-martial.6 Neither the Manual, nor this
article, equates liability with a finding of guilt.7 To the contrary, liability
simply denotes a legal accusation (preferably of a charge similar to an
indictment) followed by an adjudication which fully incorporates due
process. Although modern due process has significantly evolved since World
War II, the concept of command responsibility dates prior to the Fifteenth
Century with the case of Peter von Hagenbach where a court composed of
Burgundian nobles prosecuted and sentenced to death one of their own for
cruelly mistreating a civilian population in Breisach, a city that had nominally
been under Habsburg rule.8
Although the doctrine of command responsibility predates the United
States, the United States’ legal academy9 and Department of Defense (as well
as the predecessor agencies, the War Department and Department of the
Navy), have been influential in the shaping of this doctrine. For instance,
dating to the Civil War, with the issuance of General Orders 100, the United
States undertook a lead role in trying to confine war’s deleterious effects to
the actual place of the fighting and the forces involved.10 General Order 100
embodied the core law of war principles such as proportionality, distinction,
and necessity.11 Moreover, the United States Government sent
representatives to the Hague Conventions of 1899 (Convention with respect
to the Laws and Customs of War on Land),12 1907 (Convention respecting

6. Id.
7. See id. § 18.23.3.2, at 1124.
8. See, e.g., Timothy L.H. McCormack, Conceptualizing Violence: Present and Future
Developments in International Law: Panel II: Adjudication Violence: Problems Confronting
International Law and Policy on War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity: Selective Reaction to
Atrocity: War Crimes and the Development of International Criminal Law, 60 ALB. L. REV. 681,
692-93 (1997); Dr. Matthew R. Lippman, Humanitarian Law: The Development and Scope of the
Superior Orders Defense, 20 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 153, 158 (2001). Concepts of the law of war
predate the trial of von Hagenbach. See generally MAURICE KEEN, CHIVALRY 231-45 (1984).
9. See generally Neal Kumar Katyal, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: The Legal Academy Goes to
Practice, 120 HARV. L. REV. 65 (2006). Professor Katyal appears to consider the academy as one
means in which legal theory may be translated into legal practice. See Harry T. Edwards, The
Growing Disjunction between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34, 34
(1992).
10. See General Orders No. 100: Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United
States in the Field (Apr. 24, 1863), reprinted in FRANCIS LIEBER, INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE
GOVERNMENT OF ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE FIELD (Washington: Government
Printing Office 1898), http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/Instructions-gov-armies.pdf.
11. MICHAEL NEWTON & LARRY MAY, PROPORTIONALITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 107-08
(2014).
12. See Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, July 29, 1899,
32 Stat. 1803.
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the Laws and Customs of War on Land),13 as well as to the Geneva
Convention of 1929,14 and the four Geneva Conventions of 1949.15 These
representatives shaped a “majoritarian approach” to international law, and as
well as an expansion of a law of war regime to constrain conflict.16 Although
in several instances the United States has neither participated in international
judicial bodies nor adhered to significant decisions of international governing
bodies, this has not resulted in narrowing the doctrine of command
responsibility.
A modern definition of command responsibility does not limit the term
“command” to a military commander; rather, extends this term to a national
leader regardless of whether this leader is elected through a democratic
process, appointed through a parliamentary process, created through
inheritance, or through a power struggle.
The term “command
responsibility” denotes the ability to govern or control aspects of a
sovereign’s armed forces as well as personnel or persons engaged in military
operations related to conflict (or support to forces engaged in military
operations) at the sovereign’s behest, or aligned with the sovereign.17 For
reasons noted below, the United States’ current doctrine of command
responsibility remains viable in light of the changing nature of foreseeable
conflicts.18 However, before any analysis can be accomplished there are two
aspects of modern military operations that are essential to discern—the
changing nature of the battlefield, and the United States Government’s
current enforcement mechanisms and practices.
It is critical to note that the United States Government has been at the
center of the changing nature of the modern “battlefield,” and its military has
applied the law of war in each conflict beginning with establishing a legal
basis (jus ad bellum) for entering into the conflict. Since World War II, the

13. See Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907,
36 Stat. 2277.
14. Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Geneva, July 27, 1929, 47 Stat.
2021, 118 L.N.T.S. 343.
15. See Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick
in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3115; Geneva Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287;
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316,
75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85.
16. See, e.g., GARY D. SOLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW IN WAR 54-60 (2016).
17. See, e.g., Ilias Bantekas, The Contemporary Law of Superior Responsibility, 93 AM. J.
INT’L L. 573 (1999); Leslie Green, Superior Orders and Command Responsibility, 75 MIL. L. REV.
309 (2003).
18. See Mamani v. Berzain, 825 F.3d 1304, 1308 (11th Cir. 2016).
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legal basis for conflict which the United States used to justify entering into a
conflict took cognizance of Articles 2(4) and 51 of the United Nations
Charter.19 “Cognizance,” however, does not denote a strict interpretation of
the wording by the executive branch in each conflict. Article 2(4) requires
signatory nations to refrain from using force or threatening force against
another state for purposes contrary to the United Nations.20 That is, the
United Nations, by its construct, strives for peaceful resolutions between
conflicting states. Article 51 permits a state to act in self-defense, but this
article also requires notification to the Security Council.21 Although the
myriad legal basis advanced by the executive branch during these operations
has often been challenged, the fact that there was a stated legal basis denotes
that, in theory, the United States will comply with prevailing rules governing
the law of war, including the enforcement of governing command
responsibility. From the end of World War II to the present, the United States
military, inter alia, has taken an overt part in conflicts in Korea (19501953),22 Lebanon (1958),23 Vietnam (1961-1975),24 the Dominican Republic

19. See Benjamin G. Davis, Refluat Stercus: A Citizen’s View of Criminal Prosecution in U.S.
Domestic Courts of High-Level U.S. Civilian Authority and Military Generals for Torture and
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment, 23 ST. JOHN’S J.L. COMM. 503, 652 (2008).
20. U.N. Article 2(4) reads: “All members shall refrain in their international relations from the
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any
other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4.
21. U.N. Article 51 reads:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective selfdefence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security
Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures
taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to
the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the
Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary
in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

U.N. Charter art. 51.
22. See United States v. Bolton, 192 F.2d 805, 806 (2d Cir. 1951); S.C. Res. 82 (June 25,
1950); S.C. Res. 83 (June 27, 1950); ROBERT LECKIE, THE WARS OF AMERICA 858 (1968).
23. Titled as “Operation Blue Bat,” and consistent with the so-called “Eisenhower Doctrine,”
the United States and Great Britain briefly occupied Beirut in 1958 for the purpose of preventing a
communist takeover of that country’s government. See, e.g., GEOFFREY WAWRO, QUICKSAND:
AMERICA’S PURSUIT OF POWER IN THE MIDDLE EAST 235-39 (2010); DOUGLAS LITTLE,
AMERICAN ORIENTALISM: THE UNITED STATES AND THE MIDDLE EAST SINCE 1945, at 235 (2008).
24. For the basis of increased United States involvement leading to an aerial campaign in
1964, see Act of Aug. 10, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-408, 78 Stat. 384 (known as the “Gulf of Tonkin
Resolution”). The historic literature on the modes of warfare and legal analysis of the United States
involvement in Vietnam are without parallel. See generally WILLIAM CONRAD GIBBONS, THE U.S.
GOVERNMENT AND THE VIETNAM WAR: EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE ROLES (1995).
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(1965),25 Grenada (1983),26 Lebanon (1983),27 Libya (1986),28 Panama
(1989-1990),29 Iraq (1990-1991),30 Somalia (1992-1993),31 Yugoslavia
(1998-1999),32 Afghanistan (2002-present),33 and Iraq (2002-present).34
Each of these examples included a presidential statement of legality as well
congressional funding. There are other examples in which the United States
Government supplied forces with military training, advisors, and materiel, as
well as a number of covert operations in which small scale “special forces”
or intelligence personnel took part that are not listed herein. With the
exception of the Korean War, none of these conflicts involved a mass
confrontation between symmetrical forces.35 In contrast, the majority of the
operations were against armed insurgencies, guerilla factions, or forces
which were not constructed to comply with international legal norms.
Asymmetrical conflict against an insurgent adversary is likely to continue for
the remainder of the century. Another type of “conflict,” discussed further

25. 52 Dep’t. St. Bull., U.S. Acts to Meet Threat in Dominican Republic 738 (1965);
ABRAHAM LOWENTHAL, THE DOMINICAN INTERVENTION 1-2 (1972).
26. See, e.g., Stefoano Luconi, Operation Urgent Fury: The Shift From Rhetorical to Military
Offensive in Reagan’s Global Rollback of Communism, in THE GLOBALIZATION OF THE COLD
WAR: DIPLOMACY AND LOCAL CONFRONTATION, 1975-85, at 38-52 (Max Guderzo & Bruna
Bagnato eds., 2010).
27. See, e.g., Geoffrey Kemp, The American Peacekeeping Force in Lebanon, in THE
MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN BEIRUT, 1982-1984, at 131 (Anthony McDermott & Kjell Skjelsbaek
eds., 1991).
28. See, e.g., WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBERG, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENT: FROM THEODORE
ROOSEVELT TO BILL CLINTON 642-43 (2015).
29. See, e.g., KARIN VON HIPPEL, DEMOCRACY BY FORCE: US MILITARY INTERVENTION IN
THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD 27-42 (2000).
30. See Crisis in the Persian Gulf: Hearings and Markup Before the H. Comm. on Foreign
Affairs, 101st Cong. 59 (1990) (statement of James A. Baker III, Sec’y of State). For pertinent
resolutions, see, e.g., S.C. Res. 661, U.N. Doc. S/RES/661 (Aug. 2, 1990); S.C. Res. 678, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/678 (Nov. 29, 1990). For the United Nations’ response, see S.C. Res. 687, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/687 (Apr. 8, 1991); William V. O’Brien, Desert Storm: A Just War Analysis, 66 ST. JOHN’S
L. REV. 797 (1992).
31. See RICHARD J. REGAN, JUST WAR: PRINCIPLES AND CASES 184-93 (1996).
32. See NATO’s Role in Relation to the Conflict in Kosovo, N. ATL. TREATY ORG.,
http://www.nato.int/kosovo/history.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2017).
33. See S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001); Address Before a Joint
Session of the Congress on the United States Response to the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2
PUB. PAPERS 1140, 1141 (Sept. 20, 2001).
34. See Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, Pub. L. No.
107-243, 116 Stat. 1498. Note that United States military forces were engaged against Saddam
Hussein’s Iraqi regime since 1992, providing air operations to contain Hussein’s forces from
attacking ethnic minorities and starting a new offensive. Remarks on Hurricane Andrew and the
Situation in Iraq and an Exchange with Reporters, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1429, 1429-30 (Aug. 26, 1992).
35. Franklin B. Miles, Asymmetric Warfare: An Historical Perspective 5, 6, 8-10 (unclassified
strategy research project) (Mar. 17, 1999), https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=439201.
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below, requires highly technical competency in space and in cyberspace
either against a symmetrical adversary (China, Russia, etc.), or against an
asymmetrical adversary (e.g. ISIS), is also a possibility.
The article is divided into two sections. Part I analyzes the constitutional
basis of command responsibility as well as how this responsibility has been
shaped by the Judicial Branch and Congress. Part II briefly discusses the
application of international law and human rights norms in the context of two
models of future operations and the corresponding potential for command
liability, beginning with the Commander in Chief. This article does not
provide the full array of international law or human rights laws, but rather
focuses on two principle areas of consideration. The first involves the use of
non-military personnel who assist or take part in quasi-military roles. An
increasing concern arises from questions over the extent of responsibility of
United States command authorities over foreign, and particularly indigenous,
forces. The second involves the targeting of an opponent’s warfighting
capabilities in future conflicts through highly technical means without a full
knowledge of the transit path to target. As a critical caveat to this article is
the concession that it is by no means as comprehensive as one might like.
Rather, the purpose of the article is to contribute to a recognition that
traditional notions of command authority in the United States constitutional
construct are expansive but, correspondingly, so too are the liabilities for
failure to adhere to the principles of the law of war. And, most importantly,
the current United States legal construct affords full opportunity for the
domestic prosecution of violations and safeguards against forces succumbing
to violations.
I.

COMMAND AUTHORITY FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE COMMANDING
OFFICER: A BRIEF ROADMAP

The United States Constitution, in Article II, Section 2, Clause 1,
empowers the President with a clear mandate of command authority over the
nation’s active duty military forces.36 Command authority traditionally flows
from the President, through the Secretary of Defense, to combatant
commanders, and then to commanding officers fielded throughout the

36. The U.S. Constitution, Article II, Section 2, Clause 1 reads in full:
The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and
of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States; he
may require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive
Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices, and he shall
have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the United States, except in
Cases of Impeachment.

U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 1.
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world.37 At present, the military is structured into nine combatant commands,
which are categorized as either “geographic” or “functional.”38 Although
constitutional and statutory constraints on this authority exist, in no direct
language does the Constitution place limits on the Commander in Chief’s
authority to command forces. There are, however, indirect limits. For
instance, Article I leaves to Congress the authority to declare war39 as well as
the authority to create laws governing the conduct of the Armed Forces,
including a state National Guard when called into federal service.40 The
primary set of governing rules for the internal discipline of the Armed Forces
37. The office and powers of the Secretary of Defense are codified in 10 U.S.C.S. § 113
(2009). See also supra note 3 for pertinent statutory text. The command authorities of combatant
commanders are authorized in 10 U.S.C. § 164 (2006). This section reads, in pertinent part:
c) Command Authority of Combatant Commanders.—
(1) Unless otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense, the authority,
direction, and control of the commander of a combatant command with respect to the
commands and forces assigned to that command include the command functions of—
(A) giving authoritative direction to subordinate commands and forces necessary to carry out
missions assigned to the command, including authoritative direction over all aspects of military
operations, joint training, and logistics;
...
(E) assigning command functions to subordinate commanders . . . .

Id. Although there is an understandable misconception, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
and the Joint Chiefs possess no command authority over fielded military forces. See, e.g., U.S.
ARMED FORCES, JOINT PUBLICATION 1, DOCTRINE FOR THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED
STATES, at II-10 to II-11 (2013); DEPT. OF DEF., DIRECTIVE 5100.01, FUNCTIONS OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND ITS MAJOR COMPONENTS (2010). The Chairman serves as the
primary advisor to the President and Secretary of Defense. Id. The Chief of Staff of the Air Force,
Chief of Staff of the Army, Chief of Naval Operations, and Commandant of the United States
Marine Corps have, in addition to advising the Secretary of Defense and President, the duty to
organize, train, and equip the nation’s fielded forces. Id. The legal authority for this construct is
elaborated in 10 U.S.C.S. §§ 101-18505 (2016).
38. Combatant commands are established per 10 U.S.C. § 111(b)(9) (2006). The functional
commands include United States Transportation Command, United States Special Operations
Command, and United States Strategic Command. Each of these commands has a worldwide reach
in the sense that each deploys strategic warfighting capabilities across the globe. The geographic
commands are divisible as follows: United States Northern Command (North America), United
States European Command, United States Southern Command (South America), United States
Africa Command, United States Central Command (Egypt and the Near East), and United States
Pacific Command. The geographic commands control military forces in their area, with the
exception of specified functions such as embassy guards, special-forces, and certain intelligence
operations, operating within the command. See, e.g., DEP’T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE 5100.01,
FUNCTIONS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND ITS MAJOR COMPONENTS (2010); ANDREW
FEICKERT, CONGRESS. RESEARCH SERV., THE UNIFIED COMMAND PLAN AND COMBATANT
COMMANDS 3, 28, 36, 58 (2013); U.S. ARMED FORCES, supra note 37, at II-9 to II-13; Unified
Command Plan, U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, http://www.defense.gov/Military-Services/UnifiedCombatant-Commands (last visited Jan. 19, 2017).
39. Congress shall have power “[t]o declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and
make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water.” U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 11.
40. Congress shall have power “[t]o make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the
land and naval Forces.” U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 14.
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is the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).41 In one regard, the UCMJ
sets limits on the president’s control over service members. This body of law
prevents military commanders from interfering in military trials, to convict
service-members and others on trial, or to deny such persons of their fair trial
rights.42 Additionally, because Congress holds the power to appropriate
monies for the Armed Forces, it can shape the size, scope, and availability
for deployment of the military.43 Finally, the United States Senate bears
responsibility for consenting to the promotion of commissioned officers, and
most importantly, officers who achieve the rank of general officers.44 At best,
the very wording of these legislative authorities are only indirect influences
on the President’s commander in chief powers over the forces of the United
States. On the other hand, while the President’s command authority is broad,
it has been both expanded and constricted by the judicial and legislative
branches.
a. Judicial Buttressing of Command Authority through Constitutional
Jurisprudence
There are three countervailing aspects of the federal judiciary regarding
command authority. The first aspect is that from the earliest period in the
nation’s history, the judiciary determined that there was no inconsistency
between the Constitution’s construct and president’s unparalleled authority
over the military.45 Although the federal judiciary’s early jurisprudence
established the constitutional consistency of the president’s command
authority, an important recognition is that in 1896, in Closson v. United States
ex rel. Armes, the Court of the Appeals for the District of Columbia indirectly
found that command authority delegated by the President through the
Secretary of War and to the various commands in the Army remained
constitutional.46 Thus, a secretary of defense or subordinate military
41. See, e.g., Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-946 (2006).
42. See 10 U.S.C. § 837 (2006).
43.
The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay
the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States; but
all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States. . . . To raise and
support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term
than two Years. . . . To provide and maintain a Navy.

U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 1, 12-13.
44. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 624(c) (1994).
45. See David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb
– A Constitutional History, 121 HARV. L. REV. 941, 946-49 (2008).
46. See Closson v. United States ex rel. Armes, 7 App. D.C. 460 (D.C. Cir. 1986). Much of
the literature regarding this decision involved court-martial jurisdiction over civilians because
Armes was a retired officer recalled to active duty for the purpose of a court-martial proceeding.
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commanders carry with them, a delegable mantle of the president’s command
authority. A second aspect of the command authority arises when the
president exercises a command outside of the parameters of statutory law.
That is, the president can commit military forces into an overseas operation
contrary to congressional intent.47 The federal judiciary, through a doctrine
of non-justiciability arising from a “political question,” has indirectly
strengthened the president’s command authority by informing the nation’s
citizenry that challenges to presidential actions in the realm of command
authority over overseas deployed military forces can only be resolved
through the electorate or the legislative branch.48 For instance, in 1953, the
Orloff v. Willoughby, the Court determined that the judicial branch was not
competent to review the placement of service-members within the military,
and, in the middle of its decision, the Court noted “judges are not given the
task of running the Army.”49 Although Orloff may be of limited value in the
present as a result of superseding laws ending the conscription program
which gave rise to that case, the comment regarding the competency of judges
provides critical context to other decisions on command authority.

Significantly, the appellate court decision also highlights the broad constitutionally permissible
scope of the downward delegation of military authority, even to retired officers. See, e.g., Joseph
Bishop, Jr., Court-Martial Jurisdiction of Military-Civilian Hybrids: Retired Regulars, Reservists,
and Discharged Prisoners, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 317, 352 (1964); Richard E. Blair, Court-Martial
Jurisdiction over Retired Regulars: An Unwarranted Extension of Military Power, 50 GEO. L. J. 79,
84-87 (1961-62); see also Taussig v. McNamara, 219 F. Supp. 757, 759 n.3 (D.D.C. 1963).
47. The controversy between the executive and legislative branches over the War Powers
Resolution provides a context for this issue. See, e.g., RICHARD NIXON, WAR POWERS
RESOLUTION, H.R. DOC. NO. 93-171 (1973); Crockett v. Reagan, 558 F. Supp. 893 (D.D.C. 1982);
JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM AND ITS
AFTERMATH 113 (1995).
48. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (holding, in a non-military decision, that the
non-justiciable test is as follows: (i) Does the issue involve resolution of questions committed by
the text of the Constitution to a coordinate branch of government?; (ii) Would resolution of the
question demand that a court move beyond areas of judicial expertise?; (iii) Do prudential
considerations counsel against judicial intervention?). In my opinion, the answer to each of these
inquiries would require us to decide this case if it were ready for review. However, in Marbury v.
Madison and Luther v. Borden, the Court had already formulated a recognition of the political
question. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 165-70 (1803); Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1, 46-57
(1849); see also Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1002 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the
judgment) (declaring the Court’s incompetency to adjudicate disputes between the legislative and
executive branches in the foreign policy arena).
49. Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 95 (1953). Of course, the federal judiciary can review
service-members’ and civilian employee claims of discrimination, but not the placement of
individual service-members to overseas locations, or the determination that service-members
receive specified training or access to classified data. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S.
677 (1973) (noting that gender discrimination in military pay and allowance mechanisms is subject
to judicial scrutiny). However, even judicial avenues of redress have significant limits. See
Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 305 (1983).
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In Martin v. Mott, an appeal arising from the 1812 War with Britain,
Justice Joseph Story, in writing for a unanimous Court, penned into the
decision the following statement on the command authority of the president:
“A prompt and unhesitating obedience to orders is indispensable to the
complete attainment of the object.”50 In Fleming v. Page,51 a decision arising
from the war with Mexico which ended in 1848, Chief Justice Taney
described the president’s commander in chief authority as “authorized to
direct the movements of the naval and military forces placed by law at his
command, and to employ them in the manner he may deem most effectual to
harass and conquer and subdue the enemy. He may invade the hostile
country, and subject it to the sovereignty and authority of the United
States.”52 In 1974, in Parker v. Levy, the Court upheld the principle that
individual military commanders to include the president, may curtail free

50. Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. 19, 30 (1827). The petitioner in this decision, a New York militia
soldier, refused to acquiesce to the state governor’s calling up of the militia in compliance with
President James Madison’s declaration of an emergency and Congress’ corresponding declaration
of war against Britain. Id. at 20-22. The War itself was controversial, as no federalist legislator
voted to declare war on Great Britain. See, e.g., DONALD HICKEY, THE WAR OF 1812: A
FORGOTTEN CONFLICT 48-52 (bicentennial ed. 2012). The reactions of citizens directed to comply
with militia obligations were correspondingly negative. See Jason Britt, Unwilling Warriors: An
Examination of the Power to Conscript in Peacetime, 4 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 400, 402 (2009).
The rest of the statement is equally salient to the understanding of command authority:
The service is a military service, and the command of a military nature; and in such cases,
every delay, and every obstacle to an efficient and immediate compliance, necessarily tend to
jeopard the public interests. While subordinate officers or soldiers are pausing to consider
whether they ought to obey, or are scrupulously weighing the evidence of the facts upon which
the commander in chief exercises the right to demand their services, the hostile enterprise may
be accomplished without the means of resistance.

Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. 19, 30 (1827). Thus, while the decision was predicated on the Military Act
of 1795, the overall passage on command authority remains a bulwark statement of the President’s
constitutional authority to the present. Id.
51. 50 U.S. 603 (1850). The issues underlying this decision did not occur as a challenge to
the President’s command authority. Rather, a shipping firm challenged a port collector of duties
against the judgement of a tax on a merchant shipment that had originated in the Mexican state of
Tamaulipas. The shipping firm claimed that since the Mexican state and its port of origin, Tampico,
were held by the United States, the tax duties levied against the shipment were in error. Chief
Justice Taney led a unanimous Court to conclude that because Congress had not incorporated this
territory into the United States as either a territory or a state, while the territory itself was subject to
United States military authority, it remained part of Mexico and was therefore a foreign land. Id. at
615. The Court, in issuing this decision placed a limit on the President from diminishing
Congressional authority in foreign policy (territorial enlargement of the United States through the
Senate’s treaty making power) as well as its authority under Article I, § 3, Clause 1 which reads:
New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union; but no new States shall be formed
or erected within the Jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be formed by the Junction
of two or more States, or parts of States, without the Consent of the Legislatures of the States
concerned as well as of the Congress.

Id. at 615.
52. Fleming, 50 U.S. at 615.
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speech in order to effectuate a disciplined force.53 Underlying this authority
is that it has been enabled by Congress through the passage of specific
statutes, though such an authority clearly predates the Constitution. In 1998,
in Department of the Navy v. Egan, the Court, in a decision arising from a
challenge to a denial of a security clearance, recognized that the judiciary has
“traditionally have been reluctant to intrude upon the authority of the
Executive in military and national security affairs.”54 And, in Solorio v.
United States, the Court upheld the ability of the President to administer the
full array of jurisdiction over service-members, through the UCMJ.55 That
there are two types of offenses within the UCMJ is critical to note. Most of
the offenses are congressionally enumerated, but several, listed under Article
134 are grants of authority to the executive branch to create crimes essential
to the “good order and discipline” of the military.56 Finally, in limited
circumstances, military jurisdiction may be asserted over civilians in the
employ of the Department of Defense.57
In addition to the federal judiciary directly recognizing the doctrine of
command authority, it has also, notwithstanding the limits set by the Court in

53. 417 U.S. 733, 759 (1974). This decision arose during the Vietnam Conflict in which
service-members had expressed their opposition to the government’s military policies by publishing
underground newspapers as well as publicly demonstrating against the war. See, e.g., Avrech v.
Sec’y of the Navy, 418 U.S. 676 (1974); Cortright v. Resor, 477 F.2d 245 (2d Cir. 1971); Priest v.
Sec’y of the Navy, 517 F.2d 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1977); DAVID CORTRIGHT, SOLDIERS IN REVOLT: GI
RESISTANCE DURING THE VIETNAM WAR 20-24 (1975); JOSHUA KASTENBERG, SHAPING
MILITARY LAW: GOVERNING A CONSTITUTIONAL MILITARY 105-18 (2014).
54. 484 U.S. 518, 530 (1988).
55. 483 U.S. 435 (1987). Solorio reversed a prior decision, O’Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S.
258 (1969), in which the Court in 1969, narrowed military jurisdiction to offenses committed
overseas as well as to offenses that had a military nexus. Id. However, Solorio eviscerated
O’Callahan. See KASTENBERG, supra note 53, at 179-81.
56. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 934 (2012). This law, which codifies the “General” article (Article
134 UCMJ) reads as follows:
Though not specifically mentioned in this chapter, all disorders and neglects to the prejudice
of good order and discipline in the armed forces, all conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon
the armed forces, and crimes and offenses not capital, of which persons subject to this chapter
may be guilty, shall be taken cognizance of by a general, special, or summary court-martial,
according to the nature and degree of the offense, and shall be punished at the discretion of
that court.

The article itself has been the subject of historic criticism. See, e.g., Paul T. Fortino, Article 134 of
the UCMJ: Will Avrech Mean Taps for the General Article, 50 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 158, 159-60
(1974); Robinson O. Everett, Article 134, Uniform Code of Military Justice: A Study in Vagueness,
37 N.C. L. REV. 142, 143 (1959). However, this grant of authority from Congress to the president
should also be viewed as a requirement that the president necessarily oversee compliance with
international law applicable to armed conflict.
57. See 10 U.S.C. § 802 Art. 2(a)(10) (2012) (stating that the doctrine applies “[i]n time of
declared war or a contingency operation [to] persons serving with or accompanying an armed force
in the field”); see also United States v. Ali, 71 M.J. 256 (C.A.A.F. 2012).
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Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer,58 indirectly but significantly
created a strengthened command authority through the aforementioned nonjusticiable political question doctrine. For instance, in Holztman v.
Schlesinger,59 the Court determined that even though a congresswoman was
among the appellants contesting the United States aerial assault in Cambodia
and Laos, and even though Congress had refused to appropriate monies for
military operations in either of the two countries, the federal judiciary would
not intervene against the executive branch.60 Although Justices William O.
Douglas and Potter Stewart tried to enable the judiciary to determine whether
the United States’ involvement in Vietnam was constitutional or
unconstitutional, the other justices refused to consider the question at all.61
During the Vietnam Conflict, neither the Court nor the lesser judiciary was
willing to directly address whether the use of conscripted citizens in the
conflict was of a constitutional magnitude.62 Even the use of military
intelligence to surveil United States citizens was determined to be outside of
the jurisdiction of the federal courts.63 And specified questions such as
whether a presidential order to place naval mines in harbors in North Vietnam
likewise were deemed to be out of the judiciary’s reach.64
The precedent set by the courts during the Vietnam Conflict continued
through later military operations. After the United States’ invasion into
Grenada, a federal court dismissed a lawsuit from eleven congressmen to
enjoin President Ronald Reagan from further deployment of forces because
Congress has not declared war.65 In 1990, forty congressmen sought to
prevent United States forces from engaging in offensive operations against
Iraq unless Congress first expressly authorized the use of such forces.66
However, a federal judge found the issue non-justiciable and solely within

58. 343 U.S. 579 (1952); see also Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866) (imposing a limit
against using the military to supersede civil trials of civilians).
59. 414 U.S. 1421 (1973).
60. 484 F.2d 1307, 1312 (2d Cir. 1973). The facts of this decision are found in Holtzman v.
Schlesinger, 361 F. Supp. 553, 555-60 (E.D.N.Y. 1973). Note that Congress had acted to prohibit
the use of funds for military operations in Cambodia. Special Foreign Assistance Act of 1971, Pub.
L. No. 91-652, § 7(a), 84 Stat. 1942, 1943 (1971) (prohibiting funds appropriated from being used
to introduce U.S. ground troops into Cambodia).
61. Mora v. McNamara, 389 U.S. 934 (1967).
62. See Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir. 1971); Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611 (D.C.
Cir. 1973).
63. Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972).
64. Da Costa v. Laird, 471 F.2d 1146 (2d Cir. 1973).
65. Conyers v. Reagan, 765 F.2d 1124 (D.C. Cir. 1985); see also Flynt v. Weinberger, 588
F. Supp. 57 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (finding the imposition of a press ban during the invasion of Grenada
a non-justiciable question).
66. See Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141 (D.D.C. 1990).
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the province of the Congress as a whole to decide.67 No domestic liability
for the exercise of command authority contrary to an international court
decision appears to exist at present. For instance, in 1986, the International
Court of Justice determined that the United States’ participation in minelaying activities in Nicaraguan waters was unenforceable through any
domestic judicial mechanism.68 In short, the president’s commander in chief
authority is enhanced by the political question non-justiciability doctrine.
Given the construct of such an expansive authority, then, a brief analysis of
the statutory restraints as well as enhancements to this authority become
critical to understanding how command responsibility exists in the nation’s
domestic jurisprudence.
b.

Statutory Basis of Command and Command Responsibility: The UCMJ

In 1950, Congress issued the UCMJ in place of two sets of laws
governing the Armed Forces.69 The UCMJ remains a unique disciplinary tool
of military commanders, but trials conducted under it largely mirror federal
criminal trials. Prior to 1950, the Army, and after 1947, the Air Force, was
governed by a set of laws titled as the Articles of War.70 Since the country’s
founding, Congress had, on five occasions, issued new versions of the
Articles of War to incorporate some expansions in due process rights.71
Personnel in the Department of the Navy were governed under the
jurisdiction of the Naval Articles.72 All uniformed service personnel,
including reservists and National Guardsmen who are called into federal duty
are subject to the UCMJ.73 Certain civilians who accompany the Armed
Forces of the United States to overseas locations are likewise subject to this
body of law.74 In theory, the UCMJ adopts the basic provisions of the law of
war.75 There is an additional statutory constraint on the commander in chief
67. Id.
68. Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice, Jun. 26,
1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 933; Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua
(Nicar v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27). On enforceability, see Shelley v. Kramer, 334
U.S. 1 (1948) and Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
69. See THE OXFORD COMPANION TO AMERICAN MILITARY HISTORY 355-56 (John
Whiteclay Chambers II et al. eds., 1999).
70. Id.
71. See JONATHAN LURIE, MILITARY JUSTICE IN AMERICA: THE U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ARMED FORCES, 1775-1980, at 1-129 (2001).
72. Id.
73. 10 U.S.C. § 12406 (2012).
74. 32 U.S.C. § 326-27 (2012).
75. See, e.g., United States v. Harman, 68 M.J. 325, 326 (C.A.A.F. 2010); GARY D. SOLIS,
MARINES AND MILITARY LAW IN VIETNAM: TRIAL BY FIRE 22-33 (1989).
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authority in terms of issuing orders to subordinate commands. In 1895,
William Winthrop, a scholar and military officer who gained the sobriquet
“the Blackstone of Military Law,” penned that the president has the authority
to issue direct orders as well as regulations to the nation’s forces.76 Yet, in
1867, Congress issued an act requiring the president to submit orders through
a chain of command, thereby prohibiting an ability to directly command
forces in the field.77 It may remain an open question as to whether this law
is enforceable or can withstand constitutional scrutiny.
While the UCMJ incorporates due process rights for service members, it
enforces the doctrine of command responsibility in a myriad of ways, and
only a few of these are noted herein. For instance, the UCMJ prohibits
persons subject to its jurisdiction from articulating contemptuous language
toward certain officials including the president, vice president, Congress as a
whole, the Secretaries of Defense and Service Secretaries, and state
governors in locations where the person is stationed.78 “Mutiny” and
“sedition” may be severely punished, to include, in rare circumstances, a
death sentence.79 Thus, freedom of speech—the most basic of rights in the
United States—is restricted in the military. Contained within the UCMJ is a
76. WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 27 (1896). On the title
“Blackstone of Military Law,” see Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 597 (2006) (citing Reid v.
Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 19 (1957)).
77. FRANCIS D. WORMUTH & EDWIN B. FIMRAGE WITH FRANCIS P. BUTLER, TO CHAIN THE
DOG OF WAR: THE WAR POWER OF CONGRESS IN HISTORY AND LAW 92 (2d ed. 1989). Note,
however, this law was issued during a period in which the president and Congress were at odds over
Reconstruction and Congress attempted to remove the president through impeachment. It is the
author’s opinion that the judiciary would conclude a challenge to this act to be nothing more than a
non-justiciable political question.
78. “Any commissioned officer who uses contemptuous words against the President, the Vice
President, Congress, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of a military department, the Secretary
of Homeland Security, or the Governor or legislature of any State, Commonwealth, or possession
in which he is on duty or present shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.” 10 U.S.C § 888
(2012).
79.
(a) Any person subject to this chapter who—
(1) with intent to usurp or override lawful military authority, refuses, in concert with any other
person, to obey orders or otherwise do his duty or creates any violence or disturbance is guilty
of mutiny;
(2) with intent to cause the overthrow or destruction of lawful civil authority, creates, in
concert with any other person, revolt, violence, or other disturbance against that authority is
guilty of sedition;
(3) fails to do his utmost to prevent and suppress a mutiny or sedition being committed in his
presence, or fails to take all reasonable means to inform his superior commissioned officer or
commanding officer of a mutiny or sedition which he knows or has reason to believe is taking
place, is guilty of a failure to suppress or report a mutiny or sedition.
(b) A person who is found guilty of attempted mutiny, mutiny, sedition, or failure to suppress
or report a mutiny or sedition shall be punished by death or such other punishment as a courtmartial may direct.

10 U.S.C. § 894 (2012).
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criminal offense enumerated as Article 92 and titled “failure to obey a lawful
order or regulation.”80 While it is true that persons subject to the UCMJ have
a duty to resist unlawful orders, both the UCMJ and corresponding case law
inform such persons that orders are presumed to be lawful.81 Congress also
enabled the Secretary of Defense and the departmental secretaries to issue
regulations to departmental personnel, and the service secretaries had the
authority to delegate through the various echelons of military command, the
authority to issue further regulations.82 As previously noted, failures to
follow regulations can also result in criminal liability for persons subject to
the UCMJ.83
The president, even while serving in the capacity as commander in chief,
is not amenable to the UCMJ’s jurisdiction. Additionally, neither the
secretary of defense nor the service secretaries can be subject to courtsmartial.84 Yet, the president, as well as the civilian personnel noted above,
possess the power of a general court martial convening authority.85 That is,
each can order a court-martial (or other military trial) to be held against a
service-member or other person subject to the military law.86 This authority,
at a minimum, places a duty on the president, secretary of defense, and
service-secretaries, in light of the Manual, to not only prosecute persons for
committing war crimes, it also, places a duty to affirmatively prevent such
crimes from occurring.87
There should be no question as to whether a failure to ensure that servicemembers and civilians accompanying comply with the laws of war
enforceable against a sitting president or the civilian leadership of the

80.
Any person subject to this chapter who—
(1) violates or fails to obey any lawful general order or regulation;
(2) having knowledge of any other lawful order issued by a member of the armed forces, which
it is his duty to obey, fails to obey the order; or
(3) is derelict in the performance of his duties;
shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.

10 U.S.C. § 892 (2012).
81. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 890 (2012) (“(i) Inference of lawfulness. An order requiring the
performance of a military duty or act may be inferred to be lawful and it is disobeyed at the peril of
the subordinate. This inference does not apply to a patently illegal order, such as one that directs the
commission of a crime. (ii) Determination of lawfulness. The lawfulness of an order is a question
of law to be determined by the military judge.”).
82. See, e.g., United States v. Romano, 45 M.J. 269 (C.A.A.F. 1990).
83. 10 U.S.C. § 892 (2012).
84. See 10 U.S.C. § 802 (2012).
85. 10 U.S.C. § 822 (2012).
86. Id. In terms of military trials (commissions) over non-uniformed combatants, see 10
U.S.C. § 948h (2012).
87. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 1.
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military to the same degree that enforceability applies against military
officers. The president is subject to impeachment for violating various
provisions in U.S. law that are applicable to all civilians such as “crimes
against the law of nations,”88 or more specific offenses such as the Torture
Victims Prevention Act of 1991.89 Given that the Constitution requires the
president to faithfully execute the nation’s laws, it must be assumed that this
provision covers all laws.
Impeachment processes begin the House of Representatives, and then
transition into the Senate.90 Constitutionally, a single member of the House
may initiate an impeachment vote against a president, vice president, or
executive officer whose position occurred as a result of the Senate
confirmation process.91 The Constitution requires two-thirds of the senators
present for a vote to concur on the individual’s removal from office.92 The
operative basis for impeachment is the commission of “high crimes and
misdemeanors.”93 Impeachment of civilian officers charged with the
maintenance and discipline of the armed forces is not unheard of in American
history. For instance, in 1876, the House of Representatives impeached
Secretary of War William Belknap for the misappropriation of federal monies
and the acceptance of money for appointments.94 And, of course, President
Richard Nixon faced the possibility of an actual impeachment trial but
resigned before submitting to the Senate’s jurisdiction.95 If, as noted above,
a president is not amenable to the UCMJ or the Manual, she or he is certainly
responsible to ensure that forces conform to the law of the former and the
expectations of the later. Of course, the liability of a president under either
the Constitution’s impeachment process, or other avenues of accountability
is not only a legal question, it also presents a political question.96

88. See, e.g., Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 13, 1 Stat. 73, 80.
89. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73. Whether the
president is subject to the criminal laws in terms of prosecution is an unknown, based on several
constitutional ramifications.
90. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5.
91. 3 ASHER C. HINDS, HINDS’ PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE
UNITED STATES § 2342, at 712, § 2400, at 823-24, § 2469, at 948 (1907).
92. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6-7.
93. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4. “The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United
States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or
other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.” Id.
94. HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 93D CONG., CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS FOR
PRESIDENTIAL IMPEACHMENT, at 20 (Comm. Print 1974); WILLIAM S. MCFEELY, GRANT: A
BIOGRAPHY 443-44 (1982).
95. See United States. v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
96. See, e.g., Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010); El-Shifa Pharm. Indus.
Co. v. United States, 607 F.3d 836, 844 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224,
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II. FUTURE OPERATIONS AND COMMAND AUTHORITY
Although there is a possibility that in the coming decades the United
States will participate in an array of conflict arenas, two areas important to
consider are operations in which the United States personnel assist in the
training and joint operations with indigenous forces and cyber operations. In
regards to cyber operations, there is, of course, a difference between state
action which falls short of war such as law enforcement and the collection of
intelligence, on the one side, and actual conflict in which the law of war
becomes a governing body of rules. This article is written in regard to only
the conflict governed by the law of war (and hence the Manual). However,
because the Manual’s drafters concluded that there are a number of
“unknowns” in the application of the law of war to cyber operations, and the
drafter’s provided very little on United States service-personnel
responsibilities regarding the conduct of indigenous police and military
forces in the treatment of their own population.
a.

Cyber Operations

Because cyber operations remain relatively new, there is little settled
agreement as to the line of delineation between a military operation and
government sanctioned “strategic messaging,” or the use of propaganda. The
ability to attack an opposing state’s or hostile organization’s critical
infrastructure through the use of electronic media in cyberspace without
placing members of an armed force (or government) can, in one respect, be
viewed as part of a continuum of warfare which began with the age of
artillery.97 However, the use of computer technology in state to state relations
as well as in dealing with even a hostile organization does not necessarily
amount to war, or even a step toward an armed conflict.98 As an example, in
2010, Iranian computers governing Siemens’ manufactured centrifuge
226-27 (1993); Stephen Wasby, Impeachment as a “Political Question”, 16 JUST. SYS. J. 113, 113116 (1994).
97. See, e.g., HEATHER DINNISS, CYBER WARFARE AND THE LAWS OF WAR 1-5, 60 (2012).
In TALLINN MANUAL 2.0 ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER OPERATIONS
(Michael N. Schmitt ed., Cambridge University Press 2017), there is a consensus among scholars
that participated in the authoring of the Manual that a cyber operation constitutes a use of force
when its scale and effects are comparable to non-cyber operations rising to the use of force. The
Manual’s drafters recognized that there the cyber-attacks against the Georgian government
constituted a use of force because these operations were used in furtherance of a kinetic military
operation. However, there was a lack of consensus amongst scholars that Stuxnet constituted a
cyber-attack. Id. at 88.
98. This is taking into account UN Charter 2(4). See generally THOMAS C. WINGFIELD, THE
LAW OF INFORMATION CONFLICT: NATIONAL SECURITY LAW IN CYBERSPACE, 354-55 (2000);
Duncan B. Hollis, An E-SOS for Cyberspace, 52 HARV. INT’L L.J. 373, 405 (2011).
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systems alleged to be used, in part, for the enrichment of fissile material
“crashed” after a malicious code caused the computers to continuously
reboot, but there is no consensus that the malicious code constituted an act of
war.99 Three years earlier, cyber-attacks against Estonian government
computer systems which likely originated in Russia were not considered to
be an act of war, even though such attacks were disabling to certain
governmental functions.100 On the other hand, cyber-attacks against the
Georgian Government prior to the Russian invasion into Georgia in 2008
were clearly part of a military operation.101 In scenarios in which the use of
cyber-based weaponry does constitute an act of war, there are several
command responsibility features important to consider.
The targeting of an opposing state’s or organization’s infrastructure by
denying the use of computer technology, disrupting critical governmental
data, corrupting governmental functions are legitimate military functions.102
The Manual describes the use cyber-based assets (or weaponry) to create
floods, disrupt civil air traffic monitoring and control systems, and the
triggering of a nuclear reactor meltdown as constituting a use of force.103
Less clear is whether these notional operations would result in a violation of
one or more of the fundamental principles of the law of war, because the
operation would depend on the necessity and proportionality of the operation,
as well as whether non-combatant populations were sufficiently protected.
Even more vexing would be to analyze the law of war principles against
would be an operation involving “strategic messaging,” which results in
civilian deaths and injuries. Additionally, the respect for neutrality remains
a guiding principle in cyber operations, as it exists in physical domains such
as maritime and airspace.104
Ultimately, in regard to military cyber operations, the president remains
responsible for ensuring that military personnel subject orders as denoted by
international law have exclusive control over the actual operation and
civilians, such as federal employees and contractors do not take direct part in
hostilities.105 As such, the president is also responsible for requiring, either
99. SOLIS, supra note 16, at 706-07.
100. Stephen W. Korns & Joshua E. Kastenberg, Georgia’s Cyber Left Hook, 38 PARAMETERS
60-63 (2009).
101. Id. at 65.
102. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, Department of State, International Law in
Cyberspace: Remarks as Prepared for Delivery to the USCYBERCOM Inter-Agency Legal
Conference (Sept. 18, 2012), reprinted in 54 HARV. INT’L L.J. ONLINE 1 (Dec. 2012).
103. MANUAL, supra note 3, at 998-99.
104. Id. at 1002.
105. See, e.g., id. at 1008; INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN
HOSTILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (2003), https://www.icrc.org/ara/
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directly, or through the delegable authority, that actual military operations in
cyberspace conform to the law of war. The failure to do so would constitute
a failure in command responsibility. Thus, when a question arises as to
whether an activity is a military operation or a state function to convince a
foreign population that its leaders are in error, there is a probable requirement
to constrain the possibility of collateral damage.
b. U.S. Oversight Over Indigenous Coalition Forces to Conform to the
Law of War
Since the beginning of the United States’ involvement in the training of
Afghani forces, a question has existed as to the extent that United States
forces are required to “police” indigenous forces to conform to basic laws
safeguarding human life and health. For instance, the Afghani police and
military have been accused of recruiting children to serve as soldiers.
Afghani police and soldiers have also been accused of abusing women and
children near the presence of U.S. military personnel.106 Yet news reports
indicate that although United States service-members have reported on the
abuse, there have been specific instructions to ignore the abuses.107 Such
instructions appear to run afoul of a specific Department of Defense
Instruction that personnel attached to the military are to prevent the
trafficking of humans for the purpose of prostitution.108
Should the United States military find itself in an increased ground role
in Syria or in other countries, there is a likelihood that indigenous forces
“allied” with the United States will not conform to the law of war or respect
civilians within their own country. Moreover, as in the case of Afghanistan,
the conduct of indigenous forces, while constituting repugnant illegal acts,
may not be, per se, a law of war violation because the acts are not conducted
against foreign nationals in actual conduct. But the complicity or failure of

assets/files/other/direct_participation_in_hostilities_sept_2003_eng.pdf; Geoffrey S. Corn,
Unarmed but How Dangerous? Civilian Augmentees, the Law of Armed Conflict, and the Search
for a More Effective Test for Permissible Civilian Battlefield Functions, 2 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. &
POL’Y 257, 259-61 (2008).
106. See, e.g., Shane Harris, Marines Trained That Rape in Afghanistan Is a “Cultural” Issue,
DAILY BEAST (Sept. 23, 2015, 11:12 AM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/09/23/
marines-taught-to-look-the-other-way-when-afghans-rape-children.html; Christine Hauser, Green
Beret Who Hit Afghan Child Rapist Should Be Reinstated, Lawmakers Say, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 3,
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/04/world/asia/green-beret-who-hit-child-rapist-shouldbe-reinstated-lawmakers-say.html.
107. See, e.g., Joseph Goldstein, U.S. Troops Are Told to Ignore Afghan Allies’ Abuse of Boys,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2015, at A1.
108. DEP’T OF DEF., INSTRUCTION NUMBER 2200.01, Combating Trafficking in Persons (Apr.
21, 2015).
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U.S. forces to affirmatively stop such actions from occurring does implicate
the law of war. Given the president’s expansive authority over the nation’s
forces, the issuance of orders through the Department of Defense to theatre
commanders is not only a reasonable use of authority, it appears to be
necessary. As noted earlier, in addition to the issuance of orders, the
president is empowered to craft offenses under Article 134. In regard to the
oversight of “allied forces,” no specific offense has been issued regarding a
duty to prevent abuses to non-combatants by “allied” forces. The Secretary
of Defense possesses the authority to issue an order requiring United States
personnel to protect the lives and health of local nationals.109 And such an
order would minimize allegations that United States forces aided or abetted
crimes.
While it is true that the law of war might not apply to indigenous forces,
since such forces are engaged in internal policing, the conduct of United
States service-members, civilian personnel, and contracted forces are
governed by an international law regime which mirrors the law of war. One
analogy to consider is that the law of war requires the transfer of captured
persons only to a sovereign that complies with international humanitarian
law.110 This law is mirrored in a pending bill titled “A law to establish a
policy against sexual abuse on all United States military installations,
whether located in the United States or overseas.”111 Introduced by
Congressman Duncan Hunter, a California Republican, the bill originated out
of the failure of senior commanders to enable their forces to intervene on
behalf of child victims.112 The Manual already prohibits the trafficking of
persons in detainee status for the purpose of prostitution, and Additional
Protocol I, signed on June 8, 1977, likewise prohibits “outrages upon
personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment, enforced
prostitution and any form of indecent assault.”113 While the legislative
process considers Congressman Hunter’s bill, the commander in chief could
109. However, such orders may not contravene the intent of Congress. See, e.g., Harmon v.
Brucker, 355 U.S. 579, 582 (1958).
110. See, e.g., An Arrangement for the Transfer of Enemy Prisoners of War and Civilian
Internees from the Custody of British Forces to the Custody of American Forces, Dated 31 January
1991, in THE GULF WAR 1990-91 IN INTERNATIONAL AND ENGLISH LAW 348 (Peter Rowe ed.
1993).
111. H.R. 4717, 114TH CONG. (2016) (“To establish a policy against sexual abuse on all United
States military installations, whether located in the United States or overseas.”).
112. “(a) Findings.—Congress makes the following findings in part: (1) Members of the United
States Army and Marine Corps serving in Afghanistan were advised to respect cultural and religious
practices of Afghans and told that sexual abuse perpetrated by local allies was a matter of Afghan
law.” Id.
113. Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions art. 75(2)(b), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S.
37.
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issue an order to prevent what the bill seeks, and more importantly, the
secretary of defense can likewise, take the initiative and issue a regulation to
the same effect.
CONCLUSION
This article is by no means a comprehensive analysis of command
responsibility. Yet it is clear that because the president possesses a vast array
of constitutionally based authority as commander in chief, and this authority
is delegable, there is a command responsibility which attaches to this
authority. That this authority has been judicially expanded through the nonjusticiable political question doctrine and the federal judiciary has left review
of military operations decisions to the legislative branch and electorate
should reinforce an expectation that that a sitting president has an affirmative
duty to ensure that not only the military complies with international
humanitarian law, but also that all persons amenable to United States law
who accompany the military or work alongside of it comply with the law as
well. Part of the command responsibility equation demands that in areas
which the Manual’s drafters had decided were too new to address (or areas
not envisioned at the time despite the comprehensive nature of the Manual),
the president will ensure issuance of regulations to comport with the law.
There is also the issue that liability for the failure to ensure compliance as
well as for breeches in the law also be enforced through the constitutionally
appropriate adjudication.

